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The right to oblivion, equally called right to be forgotten, is the right for natural persons to have infor-
mation about them deleted after a certain period of time. The Internet has brought with it a need for a
new balance between the free dissemination of information and individual self-determination. This
balance is precisely what is at stake with the right to oblivion. This right has three facets: the right to
oblivion of the judicial past, the right to oblivion established by data protection legislation and a new,
and still controversial, digital right to oblivion that amounts to personal data having an expiration date
or being applicable in the specific context of social networks. This paper analyses each of these facets
within the Internet environment.
Keywords
right to be forgotten, right to oblivion, privacy, data protection, right to object
Topic
IT law, data protection law
Privacidad en Internet y el derecho a ser olvidado/derecho al olvido
Resumen
El derecho al olvido, también llamado derecho a ser olvidado, es el derecho de las personas físicas a hacer
que se borre la información sobre ellas después de un período de tiempo determinado. Internet ha traído
consigo la necesidad de un nuevo equilibrio entre la libre difusión de la información y la autodeterminación
individual. Este equilibrio es precisamente lo que está en juego con el derecho al olvido. Este derecho pre-
senta tres facetas: el derecho al olvido del pasado judicial, el derecho al olvido establecido por la legislación
de protección de datos y un nuevo derecho digital y aún polémico al olvido, que equivaldría a la atribución de
una fecha de caducidad a los datos personales o que debería ser aplicable en el contexto específico de las
redes sociales. Este trabajo analiza cada una de estas facetas en el entorno de Internet.
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Introduction
The right to oblivion, equally called the right to be forgot-
ten, is the right for natural persons to have information
about them deleted after a certain period of time. 
The development of information and communication
technologies has been a determining factor as regards
extending the scope of that right. Technological progress
has had a considerable impact in this field. The Internet –
which can be taken as the most representative paradigm
of the radical technical and sociological change we are
facing – has brought with it a need for a new balance
between the free dissemination of information and indi-
vidual self-determination. This balance is precisely what is
at stake with the right to oblivion.
The infallibility of the ‘total memory’ of the Internet con-
trasts with the limits of human memory. Now memory can
be one of rancour, vengeance or belittlement, thanks to
the “eternity effect”1 of the Internet, which preserves bad
memories, past errors, writings, photos and videos we
would like to deny at a later stage. “The transparency of
the information on someone’s errors of trajectory, con-
demnations and lifestyles could affect and disturb the life
of other related people. Unfortunate or dishonest links
become very easy on the Net. They can be used by who-
ever wants to put his/her fellow man in trouble.”2 The
European Commissioner for Justice, Viviane Reding,
recently stated: “As somebody once said: ‘God forgives
and forgets but the Web never does!’ This is why the ‘right
to be forgotten’ is so important for me. With more and
more private data floating around the Web – especially on
social networking sites – people should have the right to
have their data completely removed.”3
This paper presents and analyses this right to oblivion,
examining each of its three facets, each one linked to a
specific context. But before continuing, it is advisable to
clarify the meaning of ‘Internet privacy’ which underlies
the question of the right to be forgotten. Effectively, this
notion is not always well decrypted, and an inadequate
perception of it might bring a biased approach to the
question. 
1. Internet Privacy
When considering ‘Internet privacy’, ‘privacy’ is not to
be read as ‘intimacy’ or ‘secrecy’. It rather refers to
another dimension of privacy, i.e. individual autonomy,
the capacity to make choices, to take informed deci-
sions, in other words to keep control over different
aspects of one’s life.
In the context of the Internet this dimension of privacy
means informational autonomy or informational self-
determination. The Internet handles huge quantities of
information relating to individuals. Such personal data
are frequently processed: it is disclosed, disseminated,
shared, selected, downloaded, registered and used in all
kinds of ways. In this sense, the individual autonomy is in
direct relation to personal information. Information self-
determination means the control over one’s personal
information, the individual’s right to decide which infor-
mation about themselves will be disclosed, to whom and
for what purpose.
On the Internet, at least two difficulties arise. Control
over who you are disclosing your information to is prob-
lematic. What you have agreed to disclose to certain
1. Walz (1997), p. 3.
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recipients because they belong to a determined circle
(friends, family, colleagues, persons taking part in a
forum, members of an interest group, etc.), you do not
necessarily want to be accessible to anyone else. Search
engines like Google today bring together information
from various contexts, and in doing so, they take data out
of the initial circles and make it extremely difficult to con-
trol who you disclose information to. The other difficulty
concerns the moment when disclosure occurs: what you
have disclosed at one stage in your life you do not neces-
sarily want to be permanently available. This raises the
very question of whether a right to be forgotten should
be recognised.
Before focusing on this last point, there is still one
term to clarify. The concept of personal information or
personal data is to be considered in its widest sense,
since it should not be linked to the idea of intimacy as
in a classical view of privacy, but to any information
related to a natural person, so covering professional,
commercial and published data.
In Europe, this ‘informational self-determination’ has
been recognized and protected as a right, i.e. the right
to protection of personal data. The European Court of
Human Rights has derived this new dimension of pri-
vacy from article 8 ECHR.4 The Council of Europe Con-
vention 1085 has, since 1981, established the right to
protection as regards the automated processing of per-
sonal data. The European Union Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights6 is the first general international catalogue
of fundamental freedoms and rights that mentions the
right to data protection as an autonomous right, and,
as such, protected. Article 8.1 states that “Everyone
has the right to the protection of personal data con-
cerning him or her.” Finally, the EU directive 95/467
relating to the protection of individuals, with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free move-
ment of such data, offers a very detailed legal regime.
2. The Right to Oblivion 
of the Judicial Past
2.1. The Criterion of Newsworthiness 
or of Historical Interest
The first facet of the right to oblivion, the most classical,
is linked to an individual’s judicial or criminal past. It was
at first mostly related to the creation of criminal records.
Today, the right to oblivion of the judicial past has gone
widely beyond criminal records. It has been recognized by
case law in several countries, based on the right to pri-
vacy or as part of personality rights. It is justified by faith
in a human being’s capacity to change and improve as
well as on the conviction that a person should not be
reduced to their past. Once you have paid what is due,
society must offer you the possibility to rehabilitate and
restart without bearing the weight of your past errors for
the rest of your life.
This right is in conflict with the right to information, time
being the criterion to resolve the conflict. The right to
oblivion must give priority to the requirements of the
right to information when the facts revealed present a
topical interest for disclosure, so interest is linked to the
newsworthiness of the facts. This occurs when a decision
pronounced by a court or a tribunal is part of judicial
news. It is then legitimate to refer to this decision, men-
tioning parties’ names (except if they are minors, in which
case different rules of protection apply). But with time,
when it is no more a question of news or current events,
and as long as there is no longer a justification for re-dis-
closure of the information as news, the right to oblivion
overrides the right to information. There may still be
mention of the case, but this should not include parties’
names or specific details. So the newsworthiness of a
case tips the balance in favour of the right to disseminate
instead of the right to oblivion, but as soon as it is no lon-
ger newsworthy, the scales tip the other way.
4. See, among others, E.Ct.H.R., Rotaru v. Romania, 4 May 2000, appl. no 28341/95, § 43; Amann v. Switzerland, 16 February 2000.
5. Council of Europe Convention 108 for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data (ETS No.
108, 28.1.1981).
6. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Official Journal, 18 December 2000, C-364/1. 
7. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Official Journal. L 281, 23/11/1995, p. 31-50.
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Two exceptions can be admitted, meaning that the right
to information will override in spite of time having
elapsed:
• for facts pertaining to history or concerning a matter
of historical interest and
• for facts linked to the exercise of a public activity by a
public figure.
Historical interest and general interest are also to be
taken into consideration to solve the conflict between the
right to oblivion and the right to information.
2.2. Impact of Technical Developments 
2.2.1.Gathering Information: the Power of Search 
Engines
Technical developments have radically changed the bal-
ance between the necessity to disclose judicial informa-
tion and the individual right to be forgotten. As
mentioned earlier, the slightest piece of information can
be brought to the surface and gathered along with other
pieces. This implies a radical change. It is worth citing a
change underlined by a US Supreme Court decision,8 pro-
nounced more than twenty years ago but nevertheless
very enlightening today. The case concerned a journalist
who asked for access to FBI documents relating to the
criminal records of four people. Three had died and, for
the fourth the FBI refused to disclose information stored
in a compiled format, considering that this would breach
this person’s privacy. The Supreme Court unanimously
upheld this decision, contrary to the Court of Appeal that
had stated that there was no more privacy interest since
the information had been published. The Supreme Court
ruled: “But the issue here is whether the compilation of
otherwise hard-to-obtain information alters the privacy
interest implicated by disclosure of that information.
Plainly, there is a vast difference between the public
records that might be found after a diligent search of
courthouse files, country archives, and local police stations
throughout the country, and a computerized summary
located in a single clearing house of information.”9 A Cali-
fornian Appeal Court also stated that it was “the aggre-
gate nature of the information which makes it valuable to
respondent; it is the same quality which makes its dissem-
ination constitutionally dangerous.”10
The power of Internet search engines to access all data
concerning a targeted individual at any time, from any-
where, without any administrative procedure, without
revealing the identity of the person who requested the
search, and for free, raises an even greater danger. We
must carefully reconsider the balance needed. On the pre-
cise point of data about judicial past, a first answer is
the anonymisation of case law databases available on the
Net,11 which is now the rule in the majority of European
countries. But another important source of concern,
which will be dealt with next, is the question of newspaper
archives.
2.2.2.The Eternal Availability of Information: The Case 
of Internet Newspaper Archives
Internet newspaper archives are a source of all kinds of
information that was once news: much concerning indi-
viduals, and not limited to judicial data of course. Even if
focusing on this latter, what follows is also valid for other
personal information.12
Judicial data mentioned in a newspaper are then eter-
nally available on the archives website of the newspaper.
This raises the problem of a possible conflict between the
judged person’s right to be forgotten (on the basis of
the right to privacy, the rights of personality or the right
to free development of one’s personality) and the free-
dom of the press.
There is no a priori hierarchy among human rights: con-
flicts of rights cannot be solved by giving systematic pri-
ority to one right over another. Resolving a conflict
always passes a balancing test. Conflicting rights are
8. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
9. 489 U.S., 764.  
10. Westbrook v. Los Angeles County, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382 (Cal. App. 1994)
11. On this question that cannot be developed more deeply in the present paper see De Terwangne (2005), pp. 40-48.
12. Another paper in the present issue of this Journal deals with the question of the right to oblivion and the press and goes further
into the problems linked to newspaper archives.
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weighed to reach a balanced result. The infringement
incurred by the sacrificed value should not be dispropor-
tionate with regard to the benefit obtained by the con-
flicting value.
As regards the conflict raised by Internet newspaper
archives, consideration must be given to the above-men-
tioned criteria of newsworthiness, historical interest and
public interest. By definition, information in newspaper
archives is assumed to be no longer newsworthy. When
considering the historical value of the facts, one should
specifically take into account whether other sources of
information exist. As regards judicial data, special atten-
tion must also be paid to whether an appeal has been
lodged against judicial decisions stored in newspaper
archives. If this is the case, the first judgement could be
kept in the archives but should be accompanied by a
notice specifying that the decision is under revision. 
In the recent Times Newspapers case, the European Court
of Human Rights shed some very interesting light on how
the balancing test should be implemented. Even though
the right to oblivion was not at stake in this case,13 the
statement of the Court could be usefully applied to
hypotheses implying a conflict between the freedom of
the press and the right to oblivion in presence of publicly
available newspapers archives. The Court stated that
holding archives is of great interest for society but is nev-
ertheless a secondary role of the press. As such, this
aspect of freedom of the press has less weight when strik-
ing the balance than if its main function, that of the
famous watchdog, were at stake. The Court stated that it
“agrees at the outset with the applicant’s submissions as
to the substantial contribution made by Internet archives to
preserving and making available news and information.
Such archives constitute an important source for educa-
tion and historical research, particularly as they are read-
ily accessible to the public and are generally free. The
Court therefore considers that, while the primary func-
tion of the press in a democracy is to act as a ‘public
watchdog’, it has a valuable secondary role in maintaining
and making available to the public, archives containing news
which has previously been reported. However, the margin of
appreciation afforded to states in striking the balance
between the competing rights is likely to be greater where
news archives of past events, rather than news reporting
of current affairs, are concerned. […]”14 
One can consequently envisage the outcome of a balanc-
ing test being that identifying data should be erased from
an article in Internet newspaper archives. However, this
conclusion should always be reached on a case-by-case
basis. And we should keep in mind that this problem is
mainly linked to the public availability, through the Net,
of the controversial information. The balance reached on
the Web does not necessarily correspond to what should
be done in the case of non-digital formats. Certain solu-
tions concerning Internet archives will very likely consist
in giving priority to the right to oblivion, whereas priority
will be given to freedom of the press, historical, educa-
tional and public interests for archives in formats not
accessible on the Net. The harm deriving from the eternal
and universal availability of the data on the Internet will
much more often be considered disproportionate than
the harm ensuing from local publicity subject to proce-
dures.
3. The Right to Oblivion Established 
by Data Protection Legislation
As previously noted, technological developments have
lead to the multiplication of use of data and of places
where data are stored and processed. Electronic tools
have become more and more powerful, with growing stor-
age capacities and extraordinary efficiency in selecting
and retrieving information. Data protection laws have
appeared, not to inhibit technical progress but to offer a
framework for the new developments to re-balance the
situation.
The second facet of the right to oblivion derives from this
data protection regulation. Through different principles,
this legislation guarantees what can be considered as a
right to be forgotten. But in this context, the right is
extended. It is no more exclusively linked to judicial past
but applies to processing of any personal data.
13. It was a question of potential defamation linked to information maintained in the Internet archives of The Times; the original ar-
ticles had been presented without any warning notice as to the fact that they were subject to a libel action.
14. E.Ct. H.R., Times Newspapers Limited (Nos. 1 and 2) v. the United Kingdom, 10 March 2009, appl. no. 3002/03 and no. 23676/03,
§ 45 (our italics).
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Before detailing the principles shaping this right, it is
worth stating that there exist no global, legally-binding
instruments relating to data protection.15 National and
regional laws address the subject.16 Among these, the
EU directive 95/4617 is of undoubted interest since it is
the most detailed protection regime in place, and, for
that reason, references are made to this legal instru-
ment in the following paragraphs. But while it is of
interest as a legal shaping of a right to be forgotten,
one has to bear in mind that this European regime is
not a global answer to the concerns raised in the Inter-
net universe.  
3.1. Obligation to Delete or to Anonymise 
Personal Data Derived from the Purpose 
Principle
One of the basic principles of the data protection
regime is the purpose principle. This specifies that per-
sonal data must be processed for a determined, legiti-
mate and transparent purpose. The right to oblivion
directly ensues from this principle since, according to
one of its applications, the controller of the data may
keep personal data “in a form which permits identifica-
tion of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for
the purposes for which the data were collected or for
which they are further processed”.18 This means that
personal data may be kept as such if it is justified to
achieve the purpose of processing. It should be either
anonymised or deleted once the purpose has been
achieved or as soon as it is no longer necessary to keep
the link with identifiable persons to achieve that pur-
pose. 
This rule clearly establishes a right to oblivion. To say
the least, data protection legislation establishes the
obligation for anyone who processes personal data to
foresee and to respect an expiry date for these data.
Data subjects are entitled to check this rule is
respected.19 They are granted the right to have the con-
troller erase or block the data when processing does
not comply with the limitation ensuing from the pur-
pose principle. Moreover, sanctions can be imposed in
case of infringement of the rule.20
3.2. Attenuation of the Right to be Forgotten
The authors of the Data Protection Directive were con-
scious that, in many cases, people who do historical,
scientific or statistical research have to use data not
initially collected for that purpose. Since they were
convinced that this research is important for society,
they opted for a system where historical, scientific or
statistical use of data is systematically admitted, on
condition that states lay down appropriate safeguards
for such uses.21 
This means that personal data may be kept after the
expiry date if it is justified by these specific purposes.
National safeguards vary from one state to the other.
Certain states have foreseen the obligation to anonymise
or at least to code the data. There must be some justifica-
tion to keep data in their original form. Other national
safeguards are however more minimalist.
Another specificity of data protection legislation marks a fall
as regards the right to oblivion. Article 9 of the Directive 95/
46 puts into place an exemption regime for data processing
15. The ‘Madrid Resolution’ adopted by a collective of national data protection authorities is but a proposition at this stage and is not
legally-binding. See Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (2009). 
16. Council of Europe Convention 108 for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data (ETS No.
108, 28.1.1981);  OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, published on
www.oecd.org; APEC Privacy Framework, November 2004, http://www.apec.org/content/apec/apec_groups/
som_special_task_groups/electronic_commerce.html
17. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, O.J., n° L 281 23 November 1995, p. 31.
18. Art. 6, § 1, e) of the Directive 95/46.
19. Art. 12 of the Directive 95/46.
20. Art. 24 of the Directive 95/46.
21. The same is accepted for statistical and scientific purposes, see art. 6, § 1, b), in fine, of the Directive 95/46 : “Further processing
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for journalistic purposes22 or for the purpose of artistic or lit-
erary expression. Member states are invited to themselves
define the appropriate exemptions they consider necessary
to “reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing
freedom of expression”.23 According to which derogations
have been granted by a state, persons processing personal
data for these specific purposes in that state can be freed
from the obligation to delete data once the purpose is
achieved.
3.3. Right to Object to the Processing 
of Personal Data
To benefit from the right to be forgotten deriving from
the purpose principle, the data subject does not have to
do anything: it is the data controller who has to see to it
that personal data are erased when the purpose of pro-
cessing is achieved. Another way of achieving the right to
be forgotten is established by the Directive, then left to the
data subject’s initiative.
According to article 14 of the Directive 95/46, data sub-
jects are granted the right “to object at any time on com-
pelling legitimate grounds relating to [their] particular
situation to the processing of data relating to [them…].
Where there is a justified objection, the processing insti-
gated by the controller may no longer involve those
data.” If the data are meant to be processed for the pur-
poses of direct marketing, the right to object is then not
conditioned to any justification.24 
Faced with the media fuss created around the recent
claim to guarantee everyone a digital right to be forgot-
ten, it was said that the clamour was perhaps simply
about the ‘lyric’ translation of the already existing right
to oppose.25 It is worth noting that this right to object is
not totally equivalent to a right to delete one’s personal
data. It amounts to a right to demand that processing of
the data ceases. In many cases this will imply erasing the
data since the processing includes data storage. But it
will not systematically be the case. In the direct market-
ing sector, for example, the data subject who objects to
direct marketing by phone will be put on a special list of
persons whose phone number may not be used for
direct marketing purposes (called for example ‘orange
list’ or ‘Robinson list’). 
Non-respect of objection justified by legitimate grounds is
punishable.
4. New Digital Right to Oblivion 
Claimed
Recently, the right to be forgotten has been at the heart
of intense debates, related in the press, in official reports,
political statements, and in blogs, etc. The concern
expressed is about the appropriateness of extending the
existing right to be forgotten in response to the situations
born from the development of the Internet environment.
According to the French CNIL president, what is at stake
with the rethinking of the right to oblivion is to bring back
a natural function, forgetting, that renders life bearable.26
4.1. Context of the Claim: Internet Specificities
The ‘new’ digital right to oblivion is clearly linked to cer-
tain Internet specificities. Some of these have already
been mentioned: the ‘eternity effect’ of the electronic
memory as well as the efficiency of search engines to
bring to the surface the slightest piece of information, out
of its initial context, and to gather all the pieces together
to offer a recomposed, often heterogeneous, portrait.
Linked to the ‘absolute memory’ of the Internet, this por-
trait may consist of past characteristics eternally present
and sometimes harmful in one way or another. As a mat-
ter of fact, certain companies specialised in the managing
of the ‘e-reputation’ of individuals and legal entities on
the Web have been set up. They offer to do one-shot or long-
22. To understand what a journalistic purpose means today, see the important decision of the European Court of Justice in the case
Satamedia: E.C.J., 16 December 2008, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy et Satamedia Oy, Case C-73/07. See also C. de Terwangne
(2010). “Les dérogations à la protection des données en faveur des activités de journalisme enfin élucidées”, note under E.C.J.,
16 December 2008, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy et Satamedia Oy, Case C-73/07, R.D.T.I., n° 38, pp. 132-146
23. Art. 9, in fine, of the Directive 95/46.
24. Art. 14, § 1, b) of the Directive 95/46.
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term cleaning operations to protect, maintain or restore
one’s reputation and image. 
Another specificity is that, contrary to what happens in
physical life, erasing data in the digital world means a
decision must be taken. It is a conscious and desired pro-
cess. You must have the will to delete. 
Moreover, it has become less expensive to store data
than to destroy or anonymise them. Storage capacities
have grown exponentially while their costs have dimin-
ished. “The exercise of the rights of the individual there-
fore goes against the natural economic trend.” 27
4.2. Right of Automatic Deletion of Data in the 
Electronic Environment
In response to the new developments of Internet services
and to the problematic situation deriving from the speci-
ficities of the Internet, the same proposition has been
made in political, institutional and experts’ circles to grant
data subjects an automatic right to be forgotten after the
expiration of a certain period of time. It has been pro-
posed, notably by the European Data Protection Supervi-
sor, that the existing right to be forgotten should be
extended to ensure that information automatically disap-
pears after a certain period of time, even if the data sub-
ject does not take action or is not even aware data
concerning them were ever stored.28 The Deputy-Secre-
tary General of the Council of Europe reached the same
conclusion: “The increase in storage and processing
capacities enables information concerning an individual
to circulate within the network, even though it may no
longer be valid. This makes the current principles of accu-
racy and proportionality of data obsolete. A new right to
oblivion or automatic data erasers would enable individu-
als to take control over the use of their own personal
data.”29 The Vice-President of the European Commission,
V. Reding, said in turn: “I want to introduce the ‘right to
be forgotten’. Social network sites are a great way to stay
in touch with friends and share information. But if people
no longer want to use a service, they should have no
problem wiping out their profiles. The right to be forgot-
ten is particularly relevant to personal data that is no lon-
ger needed for the purposes for which it was collected.
This right should also apply when a storage period, which
the user agreed to, has expired.”30 
These similar propositions are to attribute some kind of
expiration date to data without need for a prior analysis
on a case by case basis. A certain period of time could be
fixed, for example, for data stored on terminal equipment
such as mobile devices or computers: data would be auto-
matically deleted or blocked after the fixed period of time
if the equipment is no longer in the possession of the ini-
tial owner. 
This system already applies in some states for certain
files and registers, such as criminal files and police regis-
ters. This involves what the European Court of Human
Rights underlined in the Rotaru case: data pertaining to
the distant past of an individual raises a particular con-
cern as regards the ‘private life’ protected by Article 8, § 1
of the ECHR. It should not be kept without a very strict
analysis of the necessity as regards democratic require-
ments.31
The automaticity of the deletion or of the prohibition of
further use would need to be translated into a ‘privacy by
default’ setting for the processing of personal data, so the
right to oblivion could in turn become a ‘privacy by
design’ obligation. Such a technical answer would contrib-
ute to shift the balance in favour of the data subject, since
they would benefit from the protection without having to
take any initiative. This is particularly important in a con-
text as opaque as the Internet where much of the data
processing occurs totally outside the data subjects’
awareness. It is illusory, therefore, to guarantee individu-
als a right they would never consciously think of using. 
27. European Data Protection Supervisor (2011).
28. European Data Protection Supervisor (2011), § 85.
29. Council of Europe, Deputy Secretary General (2010) (our italics). 
30. Reding (2010) (our italics).
31. E.Ct.H.R., Rotaru v. Romania, 4 May 2000, appl. no 28341/95. See also the concurring opinion of Judge Wildhaber joined by Jud-
ges Makarczyk, Türmen, Costa, Tulkens, Casadevall and Weber.
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’Oblivion’ could mean an obligation to delete data, but
could equally refer to a prohibition to further use the
data, at least in the personalised format. This would per-
haps be more realistic taking into consideration the eco-
nomic cost of deletion mentioned earlier. If the specific
problems of Internet media and social networks are
focussed on, ‘oblivion’ could also amount to the prohibi-
tion to further disseminate the data.
4.3. Right to Have Information Deleted and 
Not Only Rendered Inaccessible
A specific problem has appeared in the environment of
social networks. Several have shown reluctance to delete
data once the person who uploaded them on a page of the
social network wanted to stop using the network. The ser-
vice generally accedes to the expressed wish to no longer
publish the data but refuses to destroy them. In answer to
this difficulty, certain voices have explored the possibility
of establishing a right to have one’s information deleted
and not only rendered inaccessible. 
This would especially apply to cases where information has
been disclosed on the concerned person’s own initiative.
This seems quite logical and evident to Peter Fleisher, who,
in spite of this, is a fervent opponent of the right to oblivion.
According to him, “If I post something online, should I have
the right to delete it again? I think most of us agree with this,
as the simplest, least controversial case. If I post a photo to
my album, I should then later be able to delete it, if I have
second-thoughts about it.”32
4.4. Difficult Practical Implementation
One must be conscious of the technical limits of the imple-
mentation of the right to be forgotten: having one’s data
deleted from the Web is not as simple as that.33 You have
first to ask the editor of the concerned website to erase the
problematic data. Once he has complied with your demand,
the information will still be available for a while in the results
presented by the search engines in the cache memory.34 It
can take some days or weeks till the next indexation of the
site will bring an updated version to the cache memory. Dur-
ing the time that the data are publicly available, interested
people may download and share the information without
you being aware of it. If you discover that, for example, other
Internet users have downloaded and re-published the infor-
mation on their website, you will have to do the cleaning job
again. And at some point in this Sisyphean activity, you will
probably face great difficulty in convincing the website edi-
tor or the inertia of your interlocutor. Moreover, the archi-
tecture of information systems has become much more
complex, with the numerous links rendering any deletion of
data tricky and expensive.35 
A recent Spanish case, where the data protection authority
set up a strategy to circumvent the difficulty, illustrates the
problems linked to deletion operations. In January 2011, the
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos ordered Google to
remove certain links to web pages hosting personal data
relating to Spanish citizens from its results. A number of
these links connected to newspaper articles containing infor-
mation which could damage the reputation of those con-
cerned. In particular, a plastic surgeon who was involved in a
case of medical malpractice, in 1991, wanted Google to
remove the related articles from search results connected
with his name. The Spanish authority argued that bringing
an injunction against search engines such as Google is the
only way to block access to sensitive material online, as
newspapers can legally refuse to comply with more informal
requests.36 However, Google refused to obey the order since
it amounted, in their view, to censorship of their results. The
case was taken to a Madrid Court which deferred it to the
European Court of Justice. The Court has been invited to
32. Fleisher (2011). 
33. See also Cyberlex (2010), op. cit., p. 41; Fleisher (2011), op. cit.; Privacy International (2011). 
34. Google presents its cached links as the following: “Google takes a snapshot of each page examined as it crawls the web and caches
these as a back-up in case the original page is unavailable. If you click on the ‘Cached’ link, you will see the web page as it looked
when we indexed it. The cached content is the content Google uses to judge whether this page is a relevant match for your query.
When the cached page is displayed, it will have a header at the top which serves as a reminder that this is not necessarily the
most recent version of the page.” Available at http://www.google.com/intl/en/help/features_list.html#cached 
35. Cyberlex (2010), p. 33.
36. Halliday (2011); “Spain demands the right to oblivion for its citizens”, Law and the Internet, The Finocchiaro Law Firm’s blog. 31
March 2011; R. G. Gómez (2011). 
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clarify whether a national data protection authority is enti-
tled to demand removal of links from the results presented
by a search engine.
As a final point concerning the specific difficulties for
implementing the right to oblivion on the Internet, the
data which would be the subject of such a right of erasure
should be clarified. Does it concern only data obtained
from the data subjects or does it also cover analytical
data or metadata created by the data controller?37
4.5. A Difficulty Ensuing from the Internet 
Economic Model
One of the targets of the right to oblivion is the traces
Internet users unconsciously leave behind while browsing
the Web. Associated with cookies, IP address retention,
surf analyses, storage of search requests on search
engines, etc., all these data are highly valuable from an
economic perspective. The length of time most Internet
actors keep all these unconscious traces is important to
them, given the economic model of service offered on the
Net: most products or services are apparently free, but
they are financed by individually targeted and behav-
ioural advertising. This definitely limits the possibility of
erasing this information.
4.6. Conflicting Interests
As already commented concerning the right to forget the
judicial past, the right to oblivion enters into conflict with
important other rights, freedoms and legitimate interests,
in particular, with freedom of expression and freedom of
the press. It impinges on the conservation of full archives,
as developed in point 2.2.2 relating to Internet newspaper
archives. For the same reason, it hurts the duty of mem-
ory. It is a hindrance to historical research. It also has an
impact on business continuity, management of employee
files, the obligation to keep evidence, etc.38 And one inevi-
tably has to take into account the obligation to retain
data for public security purposes.
The Asociación Profesional Española de Privacidad puts it
a slightly different way, presenting it as a dilemma. In the
opinion of this association, unlike the right to object, the
right to be forgotten has a retroactive effect. Conse-
quently, the question is whether individuals must be
responsible sine die for their past actions or whether it is
desirable for them to have the right to rewrite their past,
and consequently that of others.39 
The answer to such conflicts or dilemmas lies again in
applying balancing tests respecting the proportionality
principle (see above, point 2.2.2). 
Conclusion
The right to be forgotten as regards one’s criminal and
judicial past has been recognized by case law on the basis
of the right to privacy and personality rights. In the Inter-
net environment, this right could be an appropriate
answer to problems raised by the eternal electronic mem-
ory (creating the ‘eternity effect’) combined with the
retrieval and gathering power of search engines. Here,
these problems are approached through the examples of
the criminal case law freely available on the Web and of the
Internet newspaper archives equally publicly available.
The right to oblivion is not absolute and must give priority
to freedom of expression, freedom of the press, the public
right to information and public interest in historical
research whenever the balance of the conflicting values
requires it.
An extended right to oblivion, not reduced to judicial
information, is recognized and legally protected by data
protection laws. It is valid for any personal data, which is
not restricted to private or confidential data. Data protec-
tion legislation has set up a quite balanced regime as con-
cerns the right to oblivion. This right is shaped through
two main principles: the obligation to erase or anonymise
personal data once the purpose of processing is achieved
and the right granted to the data subject to object on a
justified basis to the processing of personal data.
37. De Terwangne and Moiny (2011), pp. 22-23. 
38. Ibidem.
39. Asociación Profesional Española de Privacidad (2011).
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Beyond this well-established right to be forgotten, an
even more extended right to oblivion is claimed. It is
intended to be specifically applicable in the networked
digital environment. It would mean the automatic deletion
of the data, without the data subject having to take any
steps to obtain that result. It would thus apply an expira-
tion date to the data without need for a prior analysis on a
case-by-case basis. This means the right to oblivion could
in turn become a ‘privacy by design’ obligation. The right
to have data completely erased is also claimed for data
disclosed by individuals themselves. This specifically aims
the sphere of social networks.
However, there are practical difficulties in the implemen-
tation of the right to oblivion, and the right inevitably
conflicts with other rights, freedoms and legitimate inter-
ests. Here again, a balancing test respecting the propor-
tionality principle will hopefully bring the answer as to
which value should prevail. 
The question of extending the right to be forgotten is
still controversial. Either propositions are quite delim-
ited and present the risk, if implemented in data protec-
tion legislation, of including very specific answers to
specific technological issues, which is no guarantee of
long-term applicability of the regulation. Extending the
right to be forgotten also raises concern about the restric-
tion it creates on freedom of expression, the public’s
right to information, and historical and pedagogical
interests.
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